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COORDINATED EXPENDITURE LIMITS: CAN
THEY BE SAVED?
Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman*
In Buckley v. Valeo,1 the Supreme Court upheld the Watergateinspired limits on contributions to federal candidates, but ruled that a
similar ceiling on independent expenditures was unconstitutional.2 In so
ruling, the Court recognized the many opportunities for evasion of the
contribution limits created by its holding. Thus, the Buckley Court drew
a specific distinction between expenditures "made totally independently
of the candidate and his campaign" and "prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions" that could be constitutionally regulated.3
Fueled in large part by the Supreme Court's decisions in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission
(Colorado Republican)4 and Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),5 new and important questions have
arisen about the coordination issue. Must the Federal Election Commission prove, in effect, a narrow "meeting of the minds" quasi-contractual
arrangement before it may make a finding of coordination, or are the
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA or the Act)'
and the "general understanding" language of Colorado Republican7 adequate? Even if coordination is found, does MCFL dictate that there
must be "express advocacy" present in order for a disbursement to be
considered a contribution?8 How these questions on coordination are re* Scott E. Thomas currently serves as Chairman of the Federal Election Commission. He
earned his B.A. at Stanford University in 1974 and his J.D. at Georgetown Law Center in
1977. Jeffrey H. Bowman currently serves as the Executive Assistant to the Chairman.
He earned his B.S. at the University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse in 1976 and his J.D. at George
Washington University in 1979. The opinions in this article are those of the authors and
should not be attributed to the Federal Election Commission.
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. See id. at 143.
3. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
4. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
5. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
6. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
7. See Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 614.
8. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 249.
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solved will have a dramatic impact on the current campaign finance system and the role of "soft money" 9 in that system.
This article will show that a narrow, limited test for coordination, particularly if combined with an "express advocacy" component, will create
not only a major loophole in the current contribution limits, but also
fresh opportunities for the infusion of soft money into the federal election process. Part I discusses the origins of the current contribution limits and the judicial and congressional concern that those limits not be
easily evaded. Part II analyzes the "meeting of the minds" test and the
Colorado Republican decision by reviewing two recent Commission enforcement actions involving the coordination issue. Part III considers
MCFL and whether express advocacy is necessary for a finding of a coordinated expenditure. Finally, this article concludes that for effective
contribution limitations, reporting provisions, and statute prohibitions,
narrow concepts of coordination and express advocacy cannot be applied.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL CONCERN OVER CONTRIBUTION

LIMITS

Memories of the Watergate scandal and allegations of "Government
for Sale" on both sides of the political aisle were very fresh when Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974"°
a quarter of a century ago. In fact, legislative debates on campaign finance proposals were often interspersed with discussions on impeachment proceedings. Not surprisingly, the legislative record before Congress when it passed the 1974 Amendments "was replete with specific
examples of improper attempts to obtain governmental favor in return
for large campaign contributions."" Indeed, "[r]evelations of huge contributions from the dairy industry, a number of corporations (illegally)
and ambassadors and potential ambassadors . . .dramatize[d] . . .the
widespread concerns over the problem of undue influence."' 2
In response to this perception of undue influence, the 1974 Amend9. The phrase "soft money" commonly refers to funds that cannot be contributed to
a federal candidate or political committee under the Act. These include: contributions in
excess of statutorily prescribed limits (2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994)), corporate and labor contributions (2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994)), and contributions by foreign nationals in federal, state,
and local elections (2 U.S.C. § 441e (1994)).
10. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263.
11. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam), aff'd in
part,rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
12. Id. at 839-40 (footnotes omitted).
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ments contained two key provisions. One of these provisions stated that
''no person shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any
election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000. "13 Another provision states that "no person may make any expenditure ...
relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which,
when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the
year advocating
the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds
14
$1,000.,'
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld all of the challenged
contribution ceilings against First Amendment attack." The Court found
that "the Act's primary purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance
of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions[provides] ... a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation."' 6 The Court explained:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current, and potential office holders,
the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can
never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples
surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem
is not an illusory one. 17
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions
.... Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of
the appearance of improper influence "is also critical ... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be
eroded to a disastrous extent." 8

13.

18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1970).

14. Id. § 608(e)(1).
15. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35-36, 38, 58. In particular, the Buckley Court upheld the
$1000 limit on the amount a person could contribute to a candidate or the candidate's
principal campaign committee; the $5000 limit on the contributions by a multicandidate
political committee to a candidate or the candidate's principal campaign committee; and
the overall $25,000 yearly limit on individual contributions. See id. California Medical
Ass'n v. FederalElection Commission also upheld these provisions. See 453 U.S. 182, 194
n.15 (1981).
16. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
17. Id. at 26-27. In mentioning the "deeply disturbing examples" of impropriety surfacing after the 1972 elections, the Court dropped a footnote and referred to the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Buckley "discuss[ing] a number of the abuses uncovered after the 1972
elections." Id. at 27 n.28.
18. Id. at 27 (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
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The Court found that "Congress was surely entitled to conclude...
that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to
deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system
permitting unlimited financial contributions."'1 9
By contrast, the Buckley Court held unconstitutional the ceiling on independent expenditures contained in section 608(e)(1) of the 1974
Amendments. ° It found that "there was a fundamental constitutional
difference between money spent to advertise one's views independently
of the candidate's campaign and money contributed to the candidate to
be spent on his campaign., 21 It was crucial, in the Court's view, that
"§ 608(e)(1) limits expenditures for express advocacy of candidates made
totally independently of the candidate and his campaign. 2 2 The Court
explained:
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well
provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed
may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement
and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his
agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will
be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate.2 3
In response to the Supreme Court decision in Buckley, Congress enacted a definition of "independent expenditure" as part of the Federal
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) ("[I]n Buckley[,] ...we specifically affirmed the
importance of preventing both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption."); CaliforniaMed. Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 194-95:
[In Buckley ....we] reasoned that such contribution restrictions did not directly
infringe on the ability of contributors to express their own political views, and
that such limitations served the important governmental interests in preventing
the corruption or appearance of corruption of the political process that might result if such contributions were not restrained.
Id.
19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. The Court went on to state that "Congress was justified
in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary
contributions be eliminated." Id. at 30.
20. See id. at 51.
21. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (emphasis added).
22. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). The Buckley Court held the independent expenditure
limits to be unconstitutional "because [it] found no tendency in such expenditures, uncoordinatedwith the candidate or his campaign, to corrupt or to give the appearance of corruption." PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 497 (emphasis added).
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Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, now codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(17).4 The legislative history indicates that the purpose behind 2
U.S.C. § 431(17) was to preserve the distinction drawn by the Supreme
Court between those expenditures that were "totally independent" of the
candidate's campaign and those that were not2 In fact, the concern with
total independence was so complete that the Conference Report discussing 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) takes great pains specifically to allow for just
one type of candidate communication: "[A] general request for assistance in a speech to a group of persons by itself should not be considered
to be a 'suggestion'- that such persons make an expenditure to further
such election or defeat." 26 Apparently, any candidate or campaign request for assistance beyond such general remarks to a group should be
construed as a "suggestion" and improper coordination.
The current language of the Act reflects this judicial and congressional
concern that independent expenditures be "totally independent." The
FECA at 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) defines "independent expenditure" as
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without
cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not
made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate.27

11 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(4)(i) "clarif[ies] this language '' 2 and explains that
an expenditure will not be deemed independent if there is "any arrangement, coordination or direction by the candidate or his.., agent prior to
the publication, distribution, display, or broadcast of the communica24. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90
Stat. 475 (1976) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994)).
25. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1057, at 38 (1976). Specifically, the Conference Report states: "The definition of the term 'independent expenditure' in the conference substitute is intended to be consistent with the discussion of independent political expenditures which was included in Buckley v. Valeo." Id.
26. Id. The legislative history of 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) reflects real congressional concern over the possibility that independent expenditures could be used to circumvent the
contribution limitations. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 1976:
Hearing on S.2911 et al., Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Senate
Comm. on Rules and Admin., 94th Cong. 77 (1976) (remarks of Senators Cannon, Scott,
and Kennedy); id. at 85 (statement of Senator Mondale); id. at 89 (remarks of Senator
Griffin); id. at 98 (remarks of Senator Buckley); id. at 107-08, 130 (remarks of then Assistant Attorney General Scalia).
27. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994) (emphasis added).
28. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 647
F. Supp. 987, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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tion.",29 The regulations further state that an expenditure is presumed not
independent if it is:
(A) Based on information about the candidate's plans, projects,
or needs provided to the expending person by the candidate,
or by the candidate's agents, with a view toward having an
expenditure made; or
(B)
Made by or through any person who is, or has been, authorized to raise or expend funds, who is, or has been, an officer
of an authorized committee, or who is, or has been, receiving
any form of compensation or reimbursement from the candidate, the candidate's committee or agent. °
The Act also provides that expenditures made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate,
his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered
to be a contribution to such candidate"3 and subject to the statute's contribution limitations. In Buckley, the Court cited this concept with ap29. 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(4)(i) (1999) (emphasis added).
30. Id. In PoliticalAction Committee, the Court indicated that coordination may
have been established when a multicandidate political action committee and a candidate
developed and implemented nearly identical advertising campaigns. See Federal Election
Comm'n v. Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985). In reviewing the Commission's dismissal of an administrative complaint presenting independent expenditure activity, a court noted the significant fact that the consultants had provided services to the candidate committee in Florida and to the multicandidate committee outside Florida. See
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 745 F. Supp. 742,
743 (D.D.C. 1990); see also Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) [ 5469, at 10,529
(March 12, 1980) ("[T]he time-buyer's continued work for NCPAC would compromise
NCPAC's ability to make independent expenditures in opposition to the Democratic candidate.").
31. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994). An exception to this rule is found with respect
to party-building activities. For example, state and local party committees may spend unlimited amounts for activities such as preparing and distributing slate cards, sample ballots,
and campaign materials such as pins, bumper stickers, and yard signs. All of this activity
may be coordinated with candidates. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(B)(v), (x); 431(9)(B)(iv),
(viii) (1994). Similarly, the costs of generic voter drives "that urge the general public to
register, vote or support candidates of a particular party ... without mentioning a specific
candidate," 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(a)(2)(iv) (1999), are not considered to be a contribution to a
particular candidate even though they may be coordinated with a candidate. See id.
§ 106.1(c)(2) (1999).
32. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A)-(C), (a)(3). Under the Act, individuals may contribute no more than $1000 to a candidate per election, no more than $20,000 per year to a
national political party, and no more than $5000 per year to any other political committee.
See id. § 441a(a)(1)(A)-(C). An individual's total aggregate annual contributions may not
exceed $25,000. See id. § 441a(a)(3).
Multicandidate political committees may contribute $5000 to a candidate per election,
$15,000 per year to a national political party's political committees, and $5000 per year to
any other political committee. See id. § 441a(a)(2)(A)-(C).
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proval when it stated that "controlled or coordinated expenditures are
treated as contributions rather than expenditures under the Act., 33 The
Buckley Court construed the term "contribution" to "include not only
contributions made directly or indirectly to a candidate, political party,
or campaign committee ... but also all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized
committee of the candidate." The Court ruled that, "[s]o defined, 'contributions' have a sufficiently close relationship to the goals of the Act,
for they are connected with a candidate or his campaign."35 Recognizing
the potential for evading contribution limits "by the simple expedient of
paying directly for media advertisements or for other portions of the
candidate's campaign activities," the Court found it was necessary to
treat "coordinated expenditures.., as contributions rather than expenditures . . . [to] prevent attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contribu, 36
tions.

II. THE COORDINATION ISSUE
Only once has the Supreme Court applied the above-listed principles
to decide whether "coordination" existed based upon a factual record.
In ColoradoRepublican, the Court determined that political parties were
capable of making independent expenditures on behalf of their candidates running for federal office and that such expenditures were not
subject to the coordinated expenditure limits found at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(d). 7 The Court rejected a Federal Election Commission regulation that presumes coordination between political parties and their candidates. Based upon this presumption of coordination, the regulation
stated that party committees shall "not make independent expenditures.
. in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate" for
federal office.3"
National party committees and state party committees may make coordinated expenditures in connection with the general election campaigns of their party's congressional can-

didates in amounts calculated on the basis of the relevant state's voting age population.
See id. § 441a(d). Each of the senatorial campaign committees of the two major parties
and the national committee of their party may jointly contribute a total of $17,500 to each
candidate for the Senate. See id. § 441a(h).
33. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976).
34. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).

35. Id.
36. Id. at 46-47.
37. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
518 U.S. 604, 614-16 (1996).
38. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(a)(5) (1999); cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Sena-
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Having concluded that political party committees could make independent expenditures, the Court faced the issue of whether the expenditures made by the Colorado Republican Party were actually "independent." Little information was developed in the record below to prove a
presumption of coordination between the political party and its candidates. To the contrary, evidence pointed to a lack of coordination. For
example, the Colorado Republican State Party Chairman testified in a
deposition that "he arranged for the development of the script at his own
initiative" and "he, and no one else, approved it. '39 Moreover, he further
testified that "the only other politically relevant individuals who might
have read it were the Party's executive director and political director and
that all relevant discussions took place at meetings attended only by Party
staff.",40 In short, not even a hint of involvement existed on the part of a
specific candidate.
The strongest argument for finding coordination came as a general
proposition from the State Chairman who admitted, "it was the practice
' 41
of the Party to 'coordinat[e] with the candidate' 'campaign strategy.'
The State Chairman also acknowledged that he tried to be "'as involved
as [he] could be' with the individuals seeking the Republican nomination
by making available to them 'all of the assets of the party.' 42 There was,
however, no mention of state party involvement with respect to any specific or particular candidate.
These latter statements were dismissed by the Court as "general descriptions of Party practice," and as "not refer[ring] to the advertising
campaign at issue here or to its preparation., 43 Moreover, the Court
found that they did not "conflict with, or cast significant doubt upon, the
uncontroverted direct evidence that this advertising campaign was developed by the Colorado Party independently and not pursuant to any gen44
eral or particularunderstandingwith [the candidates and their agents]."
As a result, the Court treated the state party's "expenditure, for constitutional purposes, as an
'independent' expenditure, not an indirect cam45
paign contribution.
torial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 28 n.1 (1981) ("Party committees are considered incapable of making 'independent' expenditures in connection with the campaigns of their
party's candidates.").
39. Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 614 (1996) (emphasis added).
40. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id.
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The Supreme Court in Colorado Republican found the fact that the
advertising campaign had been developed "independently and not pursuant to any general or particular understanding with a candidate" significant.46 To read the words "any general ... understanding" out of the

opinion would create an unnecessarily narrow definition of coordination
and open a large loophole in the statute. Under such a limited reading,
an organization would be allowed to meet with a candidate's campaign
team, discuss the candidate's campaign strategy and the development of
issues crucial to the campaign, and then make "independent" expenditures based on this._detailed knowledge and information. The only apparent restriction would be that an organization could not reach a "particular understanding" with the candidate's campaign team. In other
words, the candidate could not himself approve the final, finished advertisement or authorize a buy for the timing and placement of the advertisement. Obviously, such a narrow, limited approach would render the
coordination standard meaningless and allow "prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions." 47
Two recent enforcement cases, closed by the Commission, raise the
coordination issue. Under Supreme Court precedent and statute, the
Commission should have made findings of coordination in both. In the
first case, however, the Commission split on whether to pursue the matter, with the declining Commissioners essentially arguing the lack of a
"meeting of the minds" on whether an expenditure should be made. In
the second case, the Commission found coordination based on a "general
understanding" theory.
A. FECMatter Under Review (MUR) 4282
On November 20, 1995, Catholics for a Free Choice filed a complaint
with the Federal Election Commission alleging that the Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of Philadelphia (Archdiocese) had made an impermissible

46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976). For "prudential" reasons, the Colorado
Republican Court declined to decide the Colorado Party's constitutional challenge to the
coordinated party expenditure limits of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d). See Colorado Republican, 518
U.S. at 630-31 (Rehniquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and Scalia, J., concurring). Rather, the
Court remanded the case to the lower courts for further proceedings. See id. at 626. On
February 18, 1999, the district court issued an opinion finding 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) unconstitutional. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Election Comm., 41 F.
Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Colo. 1999), appealdocketed, No. 99-1211 (10th Cir. 1999). The district
court found that party committees lack "the ability to exact a quid pro quo from a candidate who needs assistance from the party during his or her campaign." Id. at 1210-11 (emphasis added).
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expenditure as a result of coordination with a federal candidate's campaign. Specifically, the complaint stated that in September, 1994, the
Archdiocese planned to distribute to Catholic churches in the diocese a
document detailing certain congressional votes made by selected candidates for federal office in Pennsylvania. The complaint charged that
"this document was substantially modified based at least in part on contacts with the Senate campaign of then U.S. Representative Rick Santorum." According to the complaint, the number of votes reviewed in the
document was lowered in such a way that the number of "correct" votes
cast by Senator Harris Wofford was reduced. Moreover, any reference
to possible "incorrect" votes cast by candidate Santorum was eliminated.49
According to internal letters and documents from the Archdiocese,
which were included with the complaint, a special project consultant
within the Archdiocese's Office of Public Affairs, prepared for the Archdiocese a draft scorecard of how Pennsylvania's incumbent members of
Congress voted on legislation of interest to the Archdiocese. At the request of her supervisor at the Archdiocese, the project consultant faxed
the draft scorecard to the Christian Coalition on September 13, 1994 for
comments.50 Negative reaction to the draft scorecard was swift and emphatic. On September 15, 1994, representatives from the Pro-Life Federation and the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference called the Project
Consultant and "expressed their great concern that distribution of the
scorecard would be disastrous because it makes Sen. Wofford look better
or just as good as Rick Santorum" on legislative votes in the scorecard
regarding abortion."
At this time, the Archdiocese project consultant indicated that she also
received a call from the Santorum campaign. There was no indication in
the record that Senator Wofford had ever received a copy of the draft
statement or had been afforded an opportunity to comment on the draft

48. Letter from Frances Kissling, President, Catholics for a Free Choice, to Lawrence
M. Noble, General Counsel, Federal Election Commission 1 (Oct. 26, 1995) (Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review (MUR) 4282).
49. See Federal Election Commission, First General Counsel's Report, 4 (Aug. 15,
1996) (MUR 4282); Letter from Frances Kissling, President, Catholics for a Free Choice,
to Lawrence M. Noble, General Counsel, Federal Election Commission 1 (Oct. 26, 1995)
(MUR 4282).
50. See Federal Election Commission, First General Counsel's Report, 10 (Aug. 15,
1996) (MUR 4282); Facsimile Letter from Karen Keller, Archdiocese of Philadelphia, to
Gail Pedrick, Christian Coalition (Sept. 13, 1994) (MUR 4282).
51. Federal Election Commission, First General Counsel's Report, 10 (Aug. 15, 1996)
(MUR 4282).
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and its impact on the campaign for United States Senate. The Santorum
Committee, however, had been afforded such an opportunity and had
also concluded that the scorecard made Senator Wofford look better or
just as good as Rick Santorum 2 In fact, counsel for the Santorum campaign admitted as much in the campaign's response to the complaint filed
with the Commission:
Our review of the facts on behalf of our clients indicates that a
representative of the Santorum committee, in reaction to a complaint received from a voter in Central Pennsylvania called a
representative of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia, complained that a "scorecard"prepared in the Archdiocese
portrayed Senator Wofford in a better light than then Congressman Santorum and asked how this was done. The Archdiocese
representative explained the process which was followed in arriving at the "scorecard." The representative of the Santorum
committee expressed his disagreement, and that was the end of
the conversation. 3
Apparently reacting to the complaints and criticisms from the Santorum campaign and others, the project consultant's supervisor at the
Archdiocese directed her to make a number of changes. First, the supervisor instructed the project consultant to "destroy and I mean really destroy" 150,000 printed copies of the draft scorecard.'" Then, according to
the project consultant, the Archdiocese changed its original selection of
roll call votes to produce a lower number of positions where Senator
Wofford supported the Archdiocese's position. Under the new version,
Senator Wofford was shown to support the Archdiocese's positions on
only two out of five Senate votes, whereas the scorecard as originally
drafted had accorded the Senator three out of five votes. The new version also removed any reference to Representative Santorum, who originally was shown to support the Archdiocese's positions on only three out
of six House votes. After the 150,000 copies of the original scorecard
were destroyed, the Archdiocese5 printed a new scorecard incorporating
these changes at a cost of $9000. 1

52. See Letter from H. Woodruff Turner, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, to Mary L.
Taksar, Federal Election Commission (Dec. 18, 1995) (MUR 4282).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. See Federal Election Commission, First General Counsel's Report, 12 (Aug. 15,
1996) (MUR 4282); see also Letter from Frances Kissling, President, Catholics for a Free
Choice, to Lawrence M. Noble, General Counsel, Federal Election Commission 2 (Nov.
20,1995) (MUR 4282).
55. See Federal Election Commission, First General Counsel's Report, 12 (Aug. 15,
1996) (MUR 4282).
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The FEC's Office of General Counsel found that although there was
no express advocacy in the new scorecards, they should be treated as inkind contributions to the campaign because the Archdiocese had consulted with campaign personnel regarding changes. Accordingly, the report recommended that the Commission find "reason to believe" the
Archdiocese had violated 2 U.S.C. § 441a through making an excessive
contribution, and that the Santorum Committee had received an excessive contribution in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(f) 6 A motion to adopt
the General Counsel's recommendations was supported by three Commissioners but opposed by two Commissioners (with one vacancy), and
thus failed to secure the four affirmative votes necessary to make a "reason to believe" determination and pursue the violation. 7
This acknowledged consultation between the Santorum Committee
and the Archdiocese, and the plain suggestion from the campaign committee to the Archdiocese that the scorecard be changed, lies at the heart
of 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i); expenditures made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate,
his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to
be a contribution to such candidate."" Where a candidate's campaign
committee contacts an organization concerning a proposed advertisement, comments on and critiques the advertisement, and ultimately expresses disagreement with it for portraying an opposing candidate "in a
better light," the advertisement should "be considered to be a contribution to such candidate."59 This is particularly true where, as here, the
Archdiocese had responded to urgings by the Santorum campaign by
making changes in the scorecard. Changing the votes in the scorecard to
worsen the record of Santorum's opponent in the final brochure was the

56. See id. at 15. The General Counsel's Report also recommended that the Santorum Committee had failed to report its receipt of that contribution in violation of 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(b)(3)(A) and (5)(A). See id.
57. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2) (1994). The FEC is composed of six members. See 2
U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1). No more than three members of the Commission may be of the same
political party. A majority of at least four votes is required for the Commission to exercise
any of its central powers. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(c). For a description of the FEC, its creation, and its early history, see Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality of Independent Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and Proper Clause: The Case
of the FederalElection Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (1987).
58. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
59. See infra Part III (discussing the issue of whether an expenditure must "expressly
advocate" a particular candidate to constitute coordination subject to contribution limitations). An advertisement would not have to reflect the expressions of a contracting campaign to constitute a contribution. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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contribution.' After these changes, it was clear that Senator Wofford no
longer was portrayed "in a better light."
In disagreeing with this analysis, Commissioners Aikens and Elliott
stated that "we would not agree that mere inquiries, without a meeting of
the minds of two or more persons on a course of action resulting in expenditures is sufficient for coordination."61 They concluded that "the
Santorum Committee representative's telephone call was a mere inquiry
to complain about an inaccurate and unfair portrayal of then-Rep. Santorum's voting record." 62 They explained:
According to a memorandum made by the Archdiocese employee who took the call, the Santorum committee representative complained about the portrayal of then Rep. Santorum's
voting record but did not ask for changes to be made to the
scorecard. There was no indication that the Santorum Committee had control over, or even knowledge of, the Archdiocese decision to eliminate Rep. Santorum from the final version.63
Nor are Commissioners Aikens and Elliott alone in urging a "meeting
of the minds" standard. A representative of the National Republican
Senatorial Committee (NRSC) similarly argued that "proof of 'coordination' requires evidence showing a meeting of the minds between the candidate's authorized representatives and the spender that such an expenditure will be made in support of the candidate's campaign, or in
opposition to his opponent." 64 He emphasized that "[t]he evil of coordinated expenditures is that they allow the candidate to control resources
65
that he would otherwise be legally precluded from controlling.,
What exactly, however, does a "meeting of the minds" test mean or entail? Is a legal contract required? Hornbook law states that a "meeting
of the minds" conveys the idea of "mutual assent" on a bargain between
60. Cf infra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that Commissioner Elliott did
not consider the new scorecard to "expressly advocate" Santorum).
61. Federal Election Commission, Statement of Reasons of Commissioners Aikens
and Elliott, 3 (June 8, 1998) (MUR 4116) (emphasis added). It was in their Statement of
Reasons on MUR 4116 that Commissioners Aikens and Elliott elucidated their "meeting
of the minds" test and discussed its application to the Santorum matter of MUR 4282. See

id.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. (emphasis added); see also Federal Election Commission, Statement of Reasons of Commissioners Aikens and Elliott, 3 (Feb. 4, 1997) (MUR 4282).
64. Comments of the National Republican Senatorial Committee to the Federal Election Commission, 6 (May 30, 1997) (submitted to the FEC for rule-making; original on file
with authors) (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 15.
66. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACrS § 107 (1952).
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two parties; "[a] contract, after all, is a meeting of the minds. 6 7 Thus,
based on a hoary principle of contract law, does a "meeting of the minds"
test require actual assent to a specific expenditure on the part of both the
spender and the candidate in order to establish coordination? If so,
without these mutual expressions of assent, there can be no coordination.
Under this theory, in MUR 4282 there was no coordination under a
"meeting of the minds" test because the Santorum Committee only made
inquiries and comments regarding the expenditure. The Santorum campaign representative complained that the scorecard portrayed the opponent "in a better light" and "expressed his disagreement," 61 but did not
actually "assent" or agree to the finished product. In effect, it appears
that there has to be some sort of offer and acceptance in order to find
coordination under the Act.
The central problem with the "meeting of the minds" approach is that
it runs counter to the statute. Under the Act, an expenditure loses its independence with much less than a "meeting of the minds":
"[E]xpenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or
concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or 69their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.,
There is no language in the statute providing an even remote basis for
a "meeting of the minds" requirement. There certainly is no language
stating, "[i]n order for an expenditure to be coordinated there must be
evidence of a candidate's agreement to the expenditure or evidence of
candidate control." Rather, the Act states broadly that "cooperation" or
"consultation" between a candidate and a spender will result in an expenditure being considered a contribution. Likewise, the statute generally states that an expenditure made in response to a "request" or "suggestion" by a candidate will result in a contribution. 7
A "meeting of the minds" requirement would effectively ignore the
broad language of the statute as written by Congress and create, in its
stead, a narrow and limited definition of coordination. For example, under the statute an expenditure made by any person after a candidate re-

67. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 864 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
68. Federal Election Commission, First General Counsel's Report, 5 (Aug. 15, 1996)
(MUR 4282) (quoting Letter from H. Woodruff Turner, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, to
Mary L. Taksar, Federal Election Commission (Dec. 18,1995) (MUR 4282)).
69. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994) (emphasis added); see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(17)
(defining the term "independent expenditure").
70. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i).
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quest or suggestion would lose its independence; under a "meeting of the
minds" test, actual agreement between the candidate and the spender on
the specific text of a specific advertisement would have to be proven.
Moreover, some might go even further and argue that under a "meeting
of the minds" test, agreement on the placement and timing of the specific
advertisement also would have to be proven in order to establish coordination. Thus, a candidate could make specific comments, requests, or
suggestions regarding an entire advertising campaign-including the
production and distribution of specific advertisements-so long as the
candidate did not actually sign off and approve the final or finished
product.71
Such a result is not only contrary to the statute, but it also undercuts
the rationale of the Supreme Court in Buckley. In striking down the
Act's limitations on independent expenditures, the Court reasoned that
"[tihe absence of prearrangement and coordination of an [independent]
expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the
value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." 72 Clearly, if a candidate is able to provide
in
comments and suggestions on an advertisement, there is an increase
73
"the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo."
It is this "danger" that the Buckley Court sought to protect against in
upholding candidate contribution limits. The Court never required evidence of actual corruption, i.e., an actual quid pro quo by contributors,
however, as justification for the contribution limits. Rather, the Court
found that the mere opportunity or potential for a quid pro quo creates
the appearance of corruption: "of almost equal concern as the danger of
actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearanceof corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions., 74 The
Court determined that "Congress was justified in concluding that the in-

71. It is interesting to note that in other contexts, express agreements are not required in order to demonstrate a statutory violation. For example, in antitrust law, where
an actual "conspiracy to restrain trade" must be proven to demonstrate a statutory violation, "it has long been settled that explicit agreement is not a necessary part of a Sherman
Act conspiracy." United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 141, 142-43 (1966).
Similarly, in the context of insider trading, "when an insider trades while in possession of
material nonpublic information, a strong inference arises that such information was used
by the insider in trading." SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998).
72. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
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terest in safeguarding against the appearanceof impropriety requires that
the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated."75
Similarly, candidate comments and suggestions on an advertisement
create in the public mind an "opportunity for abuse."76 There is no need
for evidence that an actual quid pro quo has taken place or that an actual
agreement has been reached over the text of an advertisement or its distribution. The mere opportunity or potential for a quid pro quo is sufficient. Under Buckley, it is only when expenditures are made "totally independently of the candidate and his campaign" that they may be
considered of "little assistance to the candidate's campaign 7 7 and therefore need no ceiling imposed upon them. This total independence "alleviates the danger that expenditures will be 78
given as a quid pro quo for
improper commitments from the candidate.
In MUR 4282, the public was aware that the scorecard expenditure
was not made "totally independently" of the Santorum campaign. Only
days before the Senate election, a newspaper article headlined, Political
Scorecard Becomes an Issue: Conservatives Press Philly Archdiocese, appeared. 79 After noting that the Archdiocese had destroyed the original
communication because it made Senator Wofford "'look just as good or
better than Rick Santorum,"' the article states that the matter "raises
questions about whether the archdiocese bowed to pressure from conservative groups and Santorum's campaign. '
The original Archdiocese scorecard in MUR 4282 was of "little assistance" to the Santorum campaign. It made the candidate look bad and
75. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). Similarly, in FederalElection Commission v. National
Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982), the Supreme Court indicated that Congress
only has to show a compelling interest in stopping actual or apparent corruption and does
not have to show a specific harm. See id. at 209-11. The Court further stated that
While § 441b restricts ... corporations and labor unions without great financial
resources, as well as those more fortunately situated, we accept Congress' judgment that it is the potentialfor such influence that demands regulation. Nor will
we second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic
measures where corruption is the evil feared.
Id. at 210 (emphasis added); see also United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 473 (1995) ("Congress reasonably could assume that payments of honoraria to judges or high-ranking officials in the Executive Branch might generate a[n] ...
appearance of improper influence.") (emphasis added).
76. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
77. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. See Brett Lieberman, PoliticalScorecard Becomes an Issue: Conservatives Press
Philly Archdiocese, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Nov. 4, 1994, at Al.
80. Id.
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placed his opponent in a "better light." Only after the Santorum campaign intervened and commented on the advertisement did the advertisement become something "of value"'" to the Santorum campaign.
Whether there was a formalized agreement or not, the comments and
suggestions made by the candidate committee to the Archdiocese may
have created "the danger' that [the] expenditures" could result in "a quid
pro quo."'' By contrast, a "totally independent" expenditure-one devoid of any consultation between a candidate and a third-party
spender-eliminates such opportunity for a quid pro quo and resulting
public suspicion.
B. FEC Matter Under Review (MUR) 4116
Charles Robb and Oliver North were opponents in Virginia's 1994
election for the United States Senate. Late in the campaign, Mr. North
made certain public remarks regarding his views on social security.
Within days of these remarks, the campaign manager for the Robb campaign contacted the political director for the National Council of Senior
Citizens (NCSC) and suggested that the North campaign was against
senior citizens while the Robb campaign was for seniors. The Robb
campaign asked the NCSC for its endorsement and requested that NCSC
representatives appear at a press conference to be held at Robb campaign headquarters on October 27, 1994.
In preparation for the press conference, communications between the
Robb campaign and the NCSC resulted in the sharing of information regarding the social security issue. For example, it appears the Robb campaign supplied NCSC with "talking points" to be used at the press conference." Additionally, the Robb campaign prepared a press release the
day before the press conference that contained statements attributed to
the Executive Director of NCSC, Mr. Smedley. At the press conference
itself, both Mr. Robb and Mr. Smedley strongly criticized Mr. North's
views on the social security issue. In fact, the NCSC Executive Director
announced that because of Mr. North's recent comments on social security, NCSC was endorsing the Robb campaign. The day after the press
conference, the National Council of Senior Citizens Political Action
Committee (NCSC-PAC) purchased a radio advertisement criticizing
Mr. North for his views on social security and advocating his defeat.
81. Cf. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (1994) (defining the term "contribution" to include
"anything of value").
82. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
83. See Federal Election Commission, General Counsel's Probable Cause Brief, 14
(Aug. 11, 1997) (MUR 4116).
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NCSC-PAC spent a total of $18,800 on the radio advertisement. 4
The Commission in MUR 4116 unanimously found probable cause to
believe that coordination existed between the Robb campaign and
NCSC. It did so even though there was no concrete evidence the Robb
campaign specifically authorized or approved the NCSC advertisements,
let alone their timing or placement. In fact, the Robb campaign broadly
denied any coordination with NCSC regarding the advertisements. For
example, the Robb campaign's press secretary, who arranged the joint
press conference with NCSC, was asked in deposition: "Following the
press conference, did you have any further contacts with anyone from
NCSC?" In response, he testified, "Not that I recall and there would
have been no reason to."85
Even though there is no specific evidence of coordination regarding
specific advertisements, it appears that the Robb campaign and the
NCSC had a "general understanding" regarding development of NCSCPAC's advertising campaign in the last weeks of the Senate campaign.
The request for endorsement, coupled with cooperation regarding message content and joint participation in a publicity-seeking press conference held at Robb campaign headquarters, provided clear evidence that
there was at least an exchange of campaign strategy and tactics with a
view toward having an expenditure made. As a result, the NCSC-PAC
advertisement expenditures, begun a day later, were not made independently from the campaign, and thus, constituted an excessive contribution.
The Commission's finding of coordination in MUR 4116 was based on
the Supreme Court's decisions in Buckley and ColoradoRepublican. In
Buckley, the Supreme Court drew a specific distinction between expenditures made "totally independently of the candidate and his campaign"
and "prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised
contributions" which could be constitutionally regulated."' In Colorado
Republican, the Supreme Court helped explain the phrase "totally independently" in finding that an "advertising campaign was developed by

84. Id. at 15-16. At the same time, the Robb campaign released television advertisements, radio advertisements, and flyers that also criticized the North campaign for its position on social security and cited the NCSC endorsement. It appears the Robb campaign
advertisements used statements contained in the NCSC press release distributed at the
press conference. Namely, NCSC's declaration that the North plan could "plunge millions
of elderly people into poverty" and was capable of "wreaking havoc on the pocketbooks
and lives of older Americans" was redistributed. See id. at 16. Thus, not only did the
Robb campaign persuade NCSC to take a stand on the social security issue, NCSC in return provided fodder for Robb campaign advertisements.
85. Deposition of Bert L. Rohrer, 144-45 (Apr. 22, 1997) (MUR 4116).
86. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
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the Colorado Party independently and not pursuant to any general or
particular understanding with a candidate."87 Unlike the result reached
in Colorado Republican, however, NCSC-PAC's advertising program
was developed pursuant to a "general understanding" with Robb campaign personnel. Given the general understanding that existed between
the Robb campaign and NCSC regarding the requested endorsement at
the press conference and the parallel treatment of the social security issue, the Commission found unanimously that the NCSC-PAC's advertisements were not made "totally independently" of the Robb campaign.&
The expenditures at issue in MUR 4282 involving the Santorum campaign also appeared to be clear examples of expenditures made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion
of, a candidate [or] his authorized political committee." 89 Indeed, unlike
MUR 4116 where there appeared to be only a "general understanding"
between the Robb campaign and NCSC, the Santorum MUR involved
specific consultations between the Santorum Committee and the Archdiocese regarding a specific communication. Oddly, certain Commissioners were reluctant to make even a preliminary "reason to believe" 90.
finding to investigate the Santorum campaign, but were willing to investigate and then find "probable cause" 91 against the Robb campaign. Although the Santorum decision was incorrect, 92 the Commission reached
the correct decision a year and a half later in MUR 4116.
87. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
U.S. 604, 614 (1996) (emphasis added).
88. When probable cause conciliation with the Robb respondents in MUR 4116, under 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i), failed, the Office of General Counsel recommended that
the Commission file a civil suit against respondents in United States district court. The
Commission ultimately decided, however, to exercise its prosecutorial discretion and not
pursue the matter in litigation due to a lack of litigative resources.
89. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994) (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 437g(a)(2).
91. Id. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i).
92. Through the years, litigation instituted under 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8) has generally
left undisturbed divisions among the Commissioners on whether to pursue matters on a
coordination theory. See, e.g., Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 745 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1990); Stark v. Federal Election Comm'n, 683 F.
Supp. 836 (D.D.C. 1988); Branstool v. Federal Election Comm'n, No. 92-0284 (D.D.C.
Apr. 4, 1995). There are two common threads running through these cases: (1) courts
show deference even to Commissioners who block a four-vote majority, see Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 745 F. Supp. at 745 ("[The Court] need only determine that
[its] decision 'was "sufficiently reasonable" to be accepted by a reviewing court."') (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39
(1981)), and (2) factually, the evidence of coordination must be strong to overcome broad
denials made by respondents under oath. See id. at 744-46.
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The foregoing cases illustrate the danger of a "meeting of the minds"
test. In essence, a "meeting of the minds" approach would transfer the
"totally independently" test of Buckley into a "totally controlled by the
candidate" test. Only by applying the more encompassing definitions of
coordination found in the statute, the Commission's regulations, and the
"general understanding" approach of the Colorado Republican Court,
will the public be protected from the appearance of corruption which the
contribution limits are designed to arrest.
III. THE ROLE OF EXPRESS ADVOCACY IN THE CONTRIBUTION ISSUE
A second major issue in the "coordination" debate involves "express
advocacy." Even if coordination is found, must there be express advocacy in order for a disbursement to be considered a contribution subject
to the contribution limitations and prohibitions of the Act? This section
reviews the origins of the express advocacy issue, the arguments of its
proponents in the area of coordination, and the reasons why the FEC has
never adopted an express advocacy requirement when it considers coordination.
Express advocacy is an outgrowth of Buckley v. Valeo. In addressing
one of the many issues which confronted it, the Buckley Court sought to
draw a distinction between issue advocacy and partisan advocacy focused
on a clearly identified candidate. The Buckley Court upheld as constitutional certain reporting requirements on expenditures made by individuals and groups that were "not candidates or political committees." 93 The
Court, however, did express its concern that these reporting provisions
might be applied broadly to communications discussing public issues that
also happen to be campaign issues. In order to ensure that expenditures
made for pure issue discussion would not be reportable under the Act,
the Buckley Court construed these reporting requirements "to reach only
funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate."9 4
Ten years after Buckley, the Supreme Court returned to the express
advocacy standard in MCFL. Under the Act, corporations and labor organizations may not make contributions or expenditures from their
treasury funds "in connection with" federal campaigns, and candidates
and their campaign committees may not accept such prohibited contributions or expenditures.9
In MCFL, the Supreme Court interpreted

93. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976).
94. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
95. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (emphasis added).
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2 U.S.C. § 441b to mean that expenditures for communications not coordinated with a candidate's campaign must expressly advocate a candidate
in order to be subject to the 2 U.S.C. § 441b prohibition. As a result of
MCFL, independent corporate or labor union communications that do
not contain express advocacy are allowed under the Act.
Relying on MCFL, the district court in FederalElection Commission v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee96 concluded that a
coordinated party expenditure must also contain express advocacy in order to be subject to the limitations set forth in the Act 7 Finding that
"'identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning,"' 98 the district court determined that 2 U.S.C. §
441a(d)(3) and its "expenditures in connection with" language should be
interpreted in the same manner as the MCFL Court interpreted the "in
connection with" language of 2 U.S.C. § 441b.9 Applying the "express
advocacy" test to the radio advertisement at issue in Colorado Republican,10 the district court found that an advertisement run against Senate
candidate Tim Wirth did not constitute express advocacy and was not
subject to the 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) coordinated party limitations. 1 The
Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that express advocacy is not required for
party coordinated expenditures to be subject to the limits in
96. 839 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd and remanded, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir.
1995), vacated on other grounds and remanded,518 U.S. 604 (1996) (plurality opinion).
97. See ColoradoRepublican, 839 F. Supp. at 1457; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(d).
98. Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp at 1453 (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S.
478, 484 (1990)).
99. See id. at 1453. The district court also suggested that "the Commission itself advocated the adoption of the 'express advocacy' interpretation of 'in connection with' in the

context of section 441b(a)." Id. at 1454 (quoting Orloski v. Federal Election Comm'n, 795
F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Orloski involved the Commission's approach to an issue that

"applies only to corporate funding of legislative events sponsored by a congressman."

Orloski, 795 F.2d at 165 (emphasis added). Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit recognized, the

Buckley Court "limited [the express advocacy definition] to those provisions curtailing or
prohibiting independent expenditures." Id. at 167. "This definition is not constitutionally
required for those statutory provisions limiting contributions." Id.
100. The text of the radio advertisement stated:
Paid for by the Colorado Republican State Central Committee

Here in Colorado we're used to politicians who let you know where they stand,
and I thought we could count on Tim Wirth to do the same. But the last few
weeks have been a real eye-opener. I just saw some ads where Tim Wirth said
he's for a strong defense and a balanced budget. But according to his record,
Tim Wirth voted against every major new weapon system in the last five years.
And he voted against the balanced budget amendment.

Tim Wirth has a right to run for the Senate, but he doesn't have a right to change
the facts.
Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1451 (quoting Defendant's Statement at

101. See id. at 1456-57.

7).
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2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3).' °
Even though the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's express advocacy requirement, the argument remains alive and well. In MUR 4282,
for example, Commissioner Elliott argues that even if there was coordination between the Archdiocese and the Santorum campaign, there was
no violation of the statute because there was no express advocacy. In
discussing the matter at the Commission table, Commissioner Elliott
stated:
To my way of thinking, the whole discussion of coordination is
moot because there is no express advocacy in the guide, and if
you don't have that you've got issue discussion and you don't
have to do that independently. You can do that with all the coordination you want if there is no express advocacy.' °3
The FEC, however, has stated directly that express advocacy is not required for coordinated expenditures. In Advisory Opinion 1988-22, issued just two years after MCFL, the Commission addressed the issue
specifically.' 4 The Commission found that if public communications
about candidates "are made with the cooperation, consultation or prior
consent of, or at the request or suggestion of, the candidates or their
agents, regardless of whether such references contain 'express advocacy'
or solicitations for contributions, then the payment... will constitute...
'in-kind contributions' to the identified candidates.' 0 5

102. See Colorado Republican, 59 F.3d 1015, 1022 (10th Cir. 1995). The Tenth Circuit
rejected the canon of statutory construction relied upon by the district court, believing:
"'[T]he presumption readily yields to the controlling force of the circumstance that words,
though in the same act, are found in such dissimilar connections as to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in the different parts of the act with different intent."' Id. at
1020 (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934)). This was
particularly true with regard to the distinction between 2 U.S.C. § 441b and the "independent expenditures" at issue in MCFL, 479 U.S. 238 (1986), and the coordinated party
expenditures considered to be contributions in Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. 1448.
See Colorado Republican, 59 F.3d at 1020-21. Of course, the Tenth Circuit was reversed
on other grounds in Colorado Republican when the Supreme Court rejected the presumption that political parties were incapable of making independent expenditures and found,
instead, that the anti-Wirth radio advertisement was an "'independent' expenditure." See
Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. 604, 614 (1996).
103. Federal Election Commission, Statement of Commissioner Elliott, Commission
Executive Session (Sep. 10, 1996) (MUR 4282); see also Comments of the National Republican Senatorial Committee to the Federal Election Commission, 12 (May 30, 1997)
(submitted to the FEC for rule-making; on file with authors).
104. See [1976-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5932
(1988).
105. Id. (emphasis added); see also [1976-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Election Camp.
Fin. Guide (CCH) '1 5934 (1988); [1976-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Election Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) T 5875 (1986); [1976-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide
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More recently, in MUR 3918, the Commission found that certain radio
advertisements run by Hyatt Legal Services (the Firm) constituted excessive contributions to the 1994 United States Senate campaign of Joel
Hyatt." The basis for the Commission's finding was that the Firm's advertisements were coordinated with the candidate and referred to issues
There was no express advocacy in the Firm's
raised in the campaign.'
name "Joel Hyatt" and the candidate's picIn
fact,
the
advertisements.
ture were not even seen in the advertisements. 1°8 Nonetheless, the
Commission approved unanimously a conciliation agreement in which
the Hyatt campaign and the Firm admitted a violation of the statute and
agreed to pay a civil penalty. 1°9
The conciliation agreement in MUR 3918 relied, in part, on Commission Advisory Opinion 1990-5."o In that opinion, the Commission em-

phasized that any communication coordinated with a candidate is "for
the purpose of influencing" the candidate's election if any of three factors are met: (1) the communication makes direct or indirect reference to
the candidacy, campaign, or qualifications for public office of the candidate or the candidate's opponent(s), (2) the communication makes reference to the candidate'sviews on public policy issues, or those of the candidate's opponent, or, (3) if distribution of the communication is expanded
significantly beyond its usual audience, or in any other manner that indicates utilization of the communication as a campaign communication.'
The Commission concluded unanimously that the Firm's radio advertisements were, in part, for the purpose of influencing Mr. Hyatt's election campaign. 2 There were a number of reasons for this decision. Primarily, the content of the Firm's radio advertisements was drafted by a
campaign consultant. Moreover, the advertisements made reference to
issues likely to be raised in the campaign. 3 These radio advertisements
continued to be broadcast even after those issues had been raised in the
(CCH) 5866 (1986).
106. See Conciliation Agreement, In the Matter of Hyatt et al., 8-9 (May 23, 1997)
(MUR 3918).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 5.
109. See id. at 1, 9.
110. Cf Conciliation Agreement, In the Matter of Hyatt et al., 8-9 (May 23, 1997)
(MUR 3918), with [1976-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH)
5982 (1990) (Advisory Opinion 1990-5).
111. See [1976-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5982
(emphasis added).
112. See Conciliation Agreement, In the Matter of Hyatt et al., 5, 7, 9 (May 23, 1997)
(MUR 3918).
113. See id. at 5-6.
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campaign. The Commission found that because the Firm's radio advertisements were coordinated with the candidate's campaign and were
aired, in part, for the purpose of influencing the candidate's election, part
of their value constituted an in-kind contribution from the Firm to the
campaign
committee even though there was no express advocacy pres114
ent.
The Commission's current approach is sound not only from a constitutional and statutory viewpoint, but also as a matter of policy. The Supreme Court has indicated clearly that an express advocacy test does not
apply to contributions and coordinated expenditures. In Buckley, the
Court stated flatly that "controlled or coordinated expenditures are
treated as contributions rather than expenditures under the Act.""... The
Court defined "contribution" to "include not only contributions made
directly or indirectly to a candidate, political party, or campaign committee ... but also all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the
consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the
candidate.""' 6 The Court concluded that "[s]o defined, 'contributions'
have a sufficiently close relationship to the goals of the Act, for they are
connected with a candidate or his campaign."". 7 It was only when the
Buckley Court considered the statutory provisions as they applied to independent expenditures that it found the express advocacy test necessary
to avoid vagueness."" Likewise, in MCFL, the Supreme Court specified
that the express advocacy construction was necessary only for the "provision that directly regulates independent spending."" 9 According to the
Court, there is "a fundamental constitutional difference between money
spent to advertise one's views independently of the candidate's campaign20
and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on his campaign."'
Given this "fundamental difference," there is simply no constitutional
basis for applying to contributions the express advocacy test used for independent expenditures.
The statute reflects this constitutional analysis. There is no mention of
114. See id. at 4-7; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994).
115. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976).
116. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
117. •Id.; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 492 (1985) ("[Coordinated expenditures] are considered 'contributions' under the FECA and as such are already subject to FECA's $1000 and $5000 limitations in §§ 441a(a)(1), (2).") (citations omitted).
118. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78-79.
119. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
249 (1986) (emphasis added).
120. PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 497.
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"express advocacy" in any of the statutory provisions involving contributions. The only mentions of "express advocacy" are in the definition of
"independent expenditure," ' in the disclaimer provision, and in the
provision regarding communications to a membership organization's restricted class.'
As with the "meeting of the minds" test, there is no
statutory basis for adding an express advocacy requirement to a coordinated expenditure determination.
Finally, as a policy matter, a requirement that coordinated expenditures must contain express advocacy to be treated as a contribution
makes little sense and creates a potentially large loophole in the statute.
Suppose, for example, that a candidate solicits a third party to pay the
electric bill or rent for the candidate's campaign. Is that a contribution to
the campaign? Could a foreign government or a corporation provide a
campaign committee with the free use of an airplane? Under an express
advocacy requirement, no problem. No express advocacy is present.
Under current Commission analysis, a third party payment of campaign operating expenditures would be considered an in-kind contribution to the campaign. Rather than giving a contribution to the campaign
so it can pay its office rent, a third party pays the rent directly. Under an
express advocacy requirement, however, a third party payment of campaign operating expenditures would be acceptable and proper. There
would be coordination, i.e., the candidate's asking the third party to pay
the rent, but there would be no express advocacy, and thus no contribution, to the candidate. The contribution limitations mean very little if a
third party can underwrite all of a campaign's operating expenditures.
Not only would payment of a campaign's operating expenditures apparently fall outside of the contribution limitations under an express advocacy requirement, but payment of many candidate advertisements
would as well. For example, a recent detailed study of the 1996 Senate
race in Minnesota found that less than one-fifth of the candidate advertisements contained express advocacy, less than one-fourth of them featured the candidate addressing the voters, and only twenty-one percent
of the candidate advertisements made any reference to the upcoming
election' 2 4 Yet, to argue that candidate communications discussing "is-

121. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994).
122. See 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1994). The 2 U.S.C. § 441d disclaimer provision requires,
inter alia, the name of the person who paid for a communication and a notice as to
whether the communication was authorized by a candidate on "communications expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." Id. § 441d(a).
123. See id. § 431(9)(B)(iii).
124. See Paul S. Herrnson and Diana Dwyre, Party Issue Advocacy in Congressional
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sues" do not constitute legitimate campaign activity is odd, to say the
least. "Issues," after all, are what candidates promise to campaign upon
and what, presumably, voters are most interested in having discussed. "I
intend to campaign on the issue" or "I pledge an issue-oriented campaign" are oft-repeated candidate assurances made during the course of
the campaign.'2'
If a third party payment of candidate issue discussion falls outside of
the contribution limitations under an express advocacy requirementand it appears that it does-a very large loophole is opened under the
statute.
Could a candidate solicit unlimited and unreported
contributions from an individual to discuss "issues" on local radio and
television the week before a primary or general election? Could a
foreign or domestic corporation provide unlimited soft money to
underwrite these "issue advertisements"? According to the express
advocacy requirement, coordinated payments for such an advertising
campaign would not be subject to the limitations, prohibitions, or
reporting requirements of the Act so long as the advertising did not
contain express advocacy.
Further broadening the loophole is the problem of how to define "express advocacy." Under Buckley, the purpose of the express advocacy
standard is to limit application of the pertinent reporting provision to
spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular
federal candidate. 126 Under an express advocacy standard, the reporting
requirements "shed the light of publicity on spending that is unambiguously campaign-related.1 27 Unfortunately, the Court provides no definition of what constitutes "spending that is unambiguously related to the
campaign of a particular federal candidate" or "unambiguously campaign
related." The Buckley Court only indicated that express advocacy inElection Campaigns, in

THE STATE OF THE PARTIES: THE CHANGING

ROLE OF

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PARTIES 86, 94-95 (John C. Green & Daniel M. Shea eds.,

3d ed. 1999).
125. See, e.g., Inside Politics (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 16, 1999) (interviewing
Steve Forbes: "I never made any personal attacks. I've always discussed issues, principles,
in the same way that Ronald Reagan did .... We're going to run an issues-oriented campaign."); Kate Thompson, Campaign Chief Says Forbes Will Hit Peak At Right Time,
SIOUX CITY JOURNAL, June 12, 1999 ("[A]dvice has centered around continuing to hammer Forbes' messages on the issues that Americans care about such as creating opportunity, tax reform, Social Security, education, and health care." (reporting on an interview
with Forbes National Campaign Manager Kenneth Blackwell)); G. Robert Hillman, GOP
Rivals Welcome Governor's Decision: They Urge Him to Start Debating Issues, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 3, 1999, at 12A; Paul West, Gore Campaign Goes into High Gear,
BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 16, 1999, at 1A ("Polls don't win elections, ideas do. This is going
to be about a vision of America." (quoting Vice President Al Gore)).
126. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976).
127. Id. (emphasis added).
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cludes communications containing such obvious campaign related words

or phrases as "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith
for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject'. ' 8
We have written elsewhere of the ongoing campaign finance debate
over deciding what constitutes express advocacy.

29

In essence, there are

two schools of thought. One school relies on the inclusion or exclusion
of the words and phrases listed above for determining whether a particular communication contains express advocacy. Under this "magic
words" test, express advocacy-the reach of the Act-is avoided so long

as the communication does not contain certain key phrases. The Commission's current regulations present an alternative to the "magic words"

test and recognize that there is more to express advocacy than a mere list
of words.iO In addition to using the "magic words" test, the regulations
incorporate the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Federal Election Com3
mission v. Furgatch1
1 which states that for a communication "to be express advocacy under the Act ... it must, when read as a whole, and with

limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no other reasonbut as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
able interpretation
1 2
candidate.
128. Id. at 44 n.52; see also id. at 80. In Colorado Republican, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the anti-Wirth advertisement "would not constitute express advocacy within
the narrow definition of Buckley," FederalElection Commission v. Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Committee, 59 F.3d 1015, 1023 n.10 (1995), despite the fact that it "would
leave the... (listener) with the impression that the Republican Party sought to 'diminish'
public support for Wirth and 'garner support' for the unnamed Republican nominee." Id.
at 1023. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Colorado Republican characterized the antiWirth advertisement as an "independent expenditure." See 518 U.S. 604, 614 (1996). As
defined by 2 U.S.C. § 431(17), an independent expenditure contains express advocacy.
Thus, did the Supreme Court find that the anti-Wirth advertisement constituted express
advocacy even though it did not contain any "magic words"?
129. See generally Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Is Soft Money Here to Stay
Under the "Magic Words" Doctrine?,10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 33 (1998).
130. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (1999).
131. 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); see also Express
Advocacy, Independent Expenditures, Corporate and Labor Organization Expenditures,
60 Fed. Reg. 35,292, 35,295 (1995) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a)).
132. Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 864 (emphasis added). In pertinent part, the regulation
states:
Expressly advocatingmeans any communication that(b) When taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, such as
the proximity to the election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as
containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified
candidate(s) because(1) The electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning; and
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To date, the circuits are split over how to interpret express advocacy.
The First Circuit in Maine Right to Life Committee v. Federal Election
Commission133 and the Fourth Circuit in FederalElection Commission v.
ChristianAction Network, Inc.134 have embraced the rigid "magic words"
test. M On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in Furgatchconcluded that a
communication could constitute express advocacy even though it did not
contain any of the specific buzzwords or catch phrases listed in Buckley. 136 Until the issue of what constitutes express advocacy has been decided by the Supreme Court, the uncertainty will continue.
One outcome, however, is certain. A requirement that specific phrases
or words must be present in order to find express advocacy will create a
gaping loophole in the Act. As the Furgatchcourt warned:
A test requiring the magic words "elect," "support," etc., or
their nearly perfect synonyms for a finding of express advocacy
would preserve the First Amendment right of unfettered expression only at the expense of eviscerating the [Act]. "Independent" campaign spenders working on behalf of candidates
could remain just beyond the reach of the Act by avoiding certain
key words while conveying a message that is unmistakably
di1 37
rected to the election or defeat of a named candidate.
To permit a "magic words" test to infect the analysis of coordinated
expenditures would be the worst of all worlds. In situations that present
the danger of quid pro quo consequences, a candidate easily could orchestrate a very helpful advertisement campaign paid for by an interested party that simply avoids a few obvious phrases.
IV. CONCLUSION

Suppose candidate Smith is slightly behind in the polls, low on money,
and needs help. It is the week before the election and he knows that a
wealthy contributor is planning to run an independent expenditure advertisement. Smith contacts the contributor and complains that nobody
has focused on an important matter in the campaign: various problems in
(2) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it encourages actions to
elect or defeat one or more clearly identified candidate(s) or encourages
some other kind of action.
11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1999).
133. 914 F. Supp. 8 (D. Me. 1996), affd per curiam, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 52 (1997) (mem.).
134. 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997).
135. Id. at 1050, 1060.
136. Furgatch,807 F.2d at 862-63.
137. Id. at 863 (emphasis added).
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Congressman Jones' personal life. Because of this oversight, candidate
Smith believes that Congressman Jones is viewed in a better light. Candidate Jones, however, does not want to run such an ad himself for fear
of being accused of negative advertising. After changing the advertisement to reflect these suggestions, the wealthy contributor runs it on radio
and television the weekend before the election. The advertisement says,
"Congressman Jones is a liar, a tax cheat, wife-beater, and absentee legislator-keep that in mind on Tuesday." Is this a coordinated expenditure?
Under the Act, this expenditure to influence the election is made obviously "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or
suggestion of a candidate."138 In the words of Buckley, this expenditure 1is39
not made "totally independently of the candidate and his campaign.'
Nor can it be said under the test laid out in Colorado Republican, that
the expenditure is made without "any general or particular understanding
with a candidate."' 4 Because the expenditure has plainly lost its independence, it must be considered for what it is-a contribution to the
candidate's campaign.
A "meeting of the minds" approach, however, would conclude that
there is no coordination present. Although campaign strategy has been
provided to the spender, there is no evidence that the candidate has actually asked that an (independent expenditure) advertisement be run, or
that the spender, in turn, has agreed to run an advertisement. Moreover,
there is no evidence that the candidate has any control over the text,
placement, and distribution of the advertisements. Absent evidence of a
particularized agreement between the candidate and the spender, there
was no coordination and, consequently, no contribution to the campaign.
Even if there had been a "meeting of the minds" resulting in coordination, the expenditure would remain outside the jurisdiction of the FECA
under the "magic words"/express advocacy requirement. So long as an
advertisement avoids certain words or phrases such as "vote against" or
"defeat," the "magic words" test requires that such an advertisement be
considered mere issue discussion. For example, even if candidate Smith
actually prepared the above advertisement, described precisely where it
should run, and asked the wealthy friend to pay for the advertisement
and run it the day before the election, a contribution would not exist because the advertisement does not contain express advocacy. For that
138. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994).
139. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (emphasis added).
140. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
U.S. 604, 614 (1996) (emphasis added).
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matter, the advertisement could be paid for by a foreign dictator or drug
cartel. Moreover, because this activity would fall outside the jurisdiction

of the Act, it would not need to be reported.
This article concludes that a narrow, limited definition of coordination,
along with an express advocacy test, would threaten the integrity of the

current campaign finance system. We find that under a "meeting of the
minds" test, the amount of allowable cooperation, consultation, and
communication between the candidate and the spender would effectively
convert what is supposed to be an "independent" expenditure into
nothing more than a "disguised contribution.' 14' As Buckley recognizes,
the contribution limitations become meaningless when they are evaded
"by the simple expedient of paying directly for media advertisements or
for other portions of the candidate's campaign activities. ' 42

We also conclude that an express advocacy requirement would give the
green light for corporations, labor organizations, or even foreign entities
to coordinate with candidates and create advertisements that influence
elections, but do not contain "magic words" of express advocacy. These
coordinated media campaigns could be funded with unlimited soft
money raised from prohibited domestic and foreign sources. In addition,
none of the soft money used to finance this coordinated candidate activity would be reported to the Federal Election Commission and disclosed
to the voting public. As a result, these communications would be completely outside the prohibitions, limitations, and reporting provisions of
the Act.
Placing the above activity outside the FECA would ignore the many

141. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
142. Id. at 46. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld measures designed to prevent the evasion of the contribution limitations. In Buckley, the Court upheld the $5000
contribution limitation on what political committees can give to candidates because the
limitation serves "the permissible purpose of preventing individuals from evading the applicable contribution limitations." Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added). The Buckley Court also
upheld the $25,000 annual contribution limitation because the provision "serves to prevent
evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute
massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate's political party." Id. at 38 (emphasis added). Similarly, in California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Commission, the Court upheld the $5000 limitation
on contributions to political action committees because otherwise "an individual or association seeking to evade the $1,000 limit on contributions to candidates could do so by
channeling funds through a multicandidate political committee." 453 U.S. 182, 198 (1981).
More recently, in Colorado Republican, the Court observed that it "could understand how
Congress, were it to conclude that the potential for evasion of the individual contribution
limits was a serious matter, might decide to change the statute's limitations on contributions to political parties." 518 U.S. at 617 (emphasis added).
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compelling governmental interests advanced by the Act. With respect to
contribution limitations alone,143 the Buckley Court found that "the Act's
primary purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
. ..- [provides] a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000
contribution limitation."1"44 The Court explained that "[t]o the extent that
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.14' Moreover, the Court found that "[o]f
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements
is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions."' ' The Court determined that "Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of
improper influence 'is also critical ...if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent."' 47
Thus, the Court found that "Congress was surely entitled to conclude
that... contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to
deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system
permitting unlimited financial contributions. ''4
As the "independent administrative agency vested with exclusive jurisdiction over civil enforcement of the Act,"' 49 the Federal Election Com143. Other interests advanced by the Act include the governmental interests behind 2
U.S.C. § 441b prohibitions, see Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) ("[T]he corrosive influence of concentrated corporate
wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas."), and the reporting provisions, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68, 76
("The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial governmental interests"; moreover, disclosure serves to "insure that the voters are fully informed and
to achieve through publicity the maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence
possible.").
144. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
145. Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 27.
147. Id. (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)) (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 28 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the
important governmental interest served by the Act's contribution limitations. See supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
149. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 198
n.2 (1982); see also 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(b)(1), 437d(a), (e) (1994); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 109
(noting that Congress vested the Commission with "primary and substantial responsibility
for administering and enforcing the Act").
We believe that Congress intended the FEC to act as an enforcement-minded agency.
House comments on the conference bill creating the Commission reveal a consensus that
the legislation provided for a "strong independent commission to enforce provisions of
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mission must decide what constitutes a coordinated expenditure subject
to the contribution limits. In making this determination, the Commission
must be mindful that independent expenditures involve "core First
Amendment expression."'15 At the same time, the Commission must also
be mindful that the Act's contribution limitations, according to Buckley,
are necessary to insure that our system of government's integrity is not
weakened and that citizen "confidence in the system51 of representative
Government is not... eroded to a disastrous extent.'
In Furgatch,the Ninth Circuit rejected an interpretation of the statute
which "would preserve the First Amendment right of unfettered expres'
So too, the courts
sion only at the expense of eviscerating the... Act."152
and the Commission must not define coordination in limited manner and
allow unreported soft money to influence federal elections in the guise of
"issue advertisements."' 15 3 To do so would render meaningless the limitathis act." 120 CONG. REC. 35,135 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Armstrong). As summarized
by Representative Frenzel, "[t]he establishment of an independent Commission is the key
provision in the bill." Id. "It will assure judicious, expeditious enforcement of the law,
while reversing the long history of nonenforcement." Id. Similarly, the Senate sought to
create a commission that would vigorously enforce federal election laws. In the words of
Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott: "[W]e urge the committee to resist efforts that would
reconstitute the Commission but would strip it of some or all of its principal investigative
and enforcement powers." Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 1976: Hearings
on S. 2911 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Comm. on
Rules and Admin., 94th Cong. 69 (1976). "The restorationof public confidence in the election process requires an active watchdog in this area, not a toothless lapdog." Id. (emphasis
added).
150. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48.
151. Id. at 26-27 (citing United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
152. Federal Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987).
153. After this article went to press, three district court opinions were issued, which
discussed the concept of coordination. In FederalElection Commission v. Christian Coalition (Christian Coalition), 52 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1999), the district court ruled against the
Commission on five of its six coordinated expenditure allegations and found that there
was a contested issue of fact on the six. In its decision, the district court ignored the
§441a(a)(7)(B)(i) standard of coordination as well as the Commission's regulations, created its own standard of coordination, and applied it to a new concept known as "expressive coordinated expenditures." 52 F. Supp. at 85. Under the district court's approach, the
Commission must show there had been "substantial discussion or negotiation" about a
communication so the "candidate and spender emerge as partners or joint venturers." 52
F. Supp. at 92.
In FederalElection Commission v. Public Citizen Inc. (Public Citizen), No. 1:97-CV-358
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 1999), another district court found that discussions between a spender
and a campaign did "not rise to the level of consultation or coordination." Id. at 15. Once
again, the district court ignored the Commission's regulations and created its own standard: "Coordination ...implie[s] 'some measure of collaboration beyond a mere inquiry
as to the position taken by a candidate on an issue."' Id. (citing Clifton v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309, 1311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1036 (1998)).
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tions, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of the Federal Election
Campaign Act.

Finally, in FederalElection Commission v. Freedom Heritage Forum (Freedom Heritage
Council), No. 3:98-CV-549 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 1999), the district court rejected the argument "that actual coordination of a specific disbursement must be shown in order for a
disbursement to be characterized as a coordinated expenditure." Id. at 3. The district
court concluded, however, that the Commission had failed to establish coordination based
upon the facts of this case.
It is important to note the decisions of the district courts in Christian Coalition, Public
Citizen and Freedom Heritage Council, are not binding precedent on any other federal
court, even in the same district. See, e.g., In re Korean Air Line Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171,
1176 (D.C.Cir. 1987) ("Binding precedent for all [circuits] is set only by the Supreme
Court, and for the district courts within a circuit, only by the court of appeals for that circuit."), affid, 490 U.S. 122 (1989); see also Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 623 (2d Cir.
1993); Fox v. Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1516, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Articles of Drug Consisting of 203 Paper Bags, 818 F.2d 569, 572 (7th Cir. 1987).
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